Critical Theory by Olssen, MEH
1 
 
Critical Theory 
 
Mark Olssen 
University of Surrey 
 
Critical theory emerged in Germany in the 1920s with the establishment of the Institute for 
Social Research at Frankfurt-am Main in 1923. The term ‘critical theory’ was originally 
coined and used by Max Horkheimer in 1937 to describe the theoretical programme of the 
school. Known as the ‘Frankfurt School’ the group became exiled to France then to the United 
States in the early 1930s until 1941 when it closed down. According to Löwenthal (1989: 141) 
the decision to emigrate from Germany was made as early as 1930 as a consequence of the 
rise of the Nazi’s to political power and the increasingly difficult situation faced by a group of 
intellectuals that was predominantly Jewish. Amongst its members were Max Horkheimer, 
Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Frederich Pollock, Franz Neumann, Leo Löwenthal and 
Erih Fromm. In 1934 the group were given permission to establish their Institute at Columbia 
University in New York. After the war, in 1950, it was reestablished in Frankfurt where it 
attracted new members such as Jürgen Habermas and Alfred Schmidt. 
 
Although informed by multiple perspectives, the work of the Frankfurt School began 
primarily as a Marxist critique of capitalist society.  In 1930 Horkheimer became director of 
the school, and directed its emphasis away from its initial emphasis on orthodox, scientific 
Marxism to become the mouthpiece for a more humanistic, philosophical Marxism, shifting 
the frame of reference away from a focus on the economy and exploitation towards a critique 
of culture and a concern with alienation.  In his article ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’, first 
published in 1937, Horkheimer (1972) explains that the term derives from the critical function 
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of Marxist theory as a form of opposition to bourgeios society. Whereas traditional theory 
sought to reproduce the relations of capitalist society, critical theory sought to subvert or 
undermine them. In addition, critical and traditional theory embodied two different 
Erkenntnisweisen  or modes of cognition. While the modes of cognition of traditional theory 
derived from the natural sciences, those of critical theory focussed on “men as producers of 
their own historical way of life in its totality” (Horkheimer, 1972: 244). The methods of the 
natural sciences thus misrepresented the human world by absolutizing knowledge. Science 
thus failed to understand both the reflexivity and contingency of social truths. In addition, 
because it was based upon an atomistic metaphysic, it failed to theorize the holistic, or 
contextualized character of social existence. Critical theory, for Horkheimer on the other 
hand, sought to explicate the nature of the relations between part and part, and parts and 
whole, revealing in addition its own embeddedness in the social matrix from which it arises, 
and operates. In an epistemological sense, Horkheimer maintained that an interest in the 
improvement of the human conditions of existence was intrinsic to the very capacity of 
reason, and the ability to utilize its capabilities.. In this sense, the driving force of critical 
theory was practical, and linked as a moral-political system to the improvement of the human 
condition and, as with Kant, the realization of freedom through reason. 
 
In relation to method, Kellner points out that from the beginning to the present critical theory 
has disregarded divisions between existing disciplines of knowledge stressing the 
interconnectedness between them. In Keller’s words: 
 
Critical Theory is distinguished from traditional mainstream social science through its 
multidisciplinary perspectives and its attempts to develop a dialectical and material 
social theory. This project represents a collective, supradisciplinary synthesis of 
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philosophy, the sciences and politics, in which critical social theory is produced by 
groups of theorists and scientists from various disciplines working together to produce a 
Critical Theory of the present aimed at radical socio-political transformation (Kellner, 
1989: 7) 
 
This ‘supradisciplinary’ approach, says Kellner (1989: 7), involves not just collaboration 
between researchers from different disciplines but the criticism of “the validity claims of the 
seperate disciplines”. Fundamentally this is an educational approach, conceiving education as 
unbounded by disciplinary affiliations.  In this sense critical theory provides an over-arching 
approach to the present age which links the study of educational institutions and processes to 
philosophy, politics, and economics in its critique of culture and philosophy. Linking theory 
and practice, it seeks to isolate and expose the relationships between cultural elements, 
economic and social processes, and the historical context.  
 
From Marxism to postructuralism and pluralism 
Although initially conceived as a Marxist critique of capitalist society, the theoretical base of 
critical theory was soon to broaden incorporating ideas drawn selectively from Neitzsche, 
Marx, Weber, Heidegger, Lukács, Korsch and Hegel. These influences were increasingly 
incorporated as critical theory sought to challenge the traditions of modernity, a core theme 
which it had been concerned with from the start in its opposition to the forces of moderisation 
and representations of modernity which saw it as a purely positive force linked to the 
development and progress of science, technology and industry, and instrumental conceptions 
of education.  
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Much of Horkheimer’s early approach can be saddled with a totalizing concern with the 
realization of reason through history carrying, expressing as Hoy and McCarthy (1994: 13) 
have put it, a number of “left-Hegelian formulae…[which] have a disagreeably totalizing ring 
to them”. These emphases include:  
 
[h]is tendency to conceptualize society as at least potentially a unified 
subject with a unified will and, hence, to marginalize considerations of 
social, cultural, and political pluralism; his over-reliance on Marxian 
political economy, particularly class analysis, in identifying the causes and 
conditions of injustice in existing social orders; his subscription to a 
philosophy of history or “grand metanarrative” that underplayed the roles of 
contingency, locality, and identity in struggles against oppression (ibid) 
 
Hegel’s emphasis on oneness, unity and the dialectical possibility of achieving truth in 
history, were themes increasingly criticised, first by Adorno (1973), stressing the ‘non-
identical’ relationship of discourse to the world which manifested itself in fragmentation, 
diversity, and multiplicity of perspectives. Historical necessity is thus replaced by an 
emphasis upon discontinuity, pluralism, contingency and chance, representing as Hoy and 
McCarthy (1994: 119) put it “a partial critique of Hegel, one that is inspired initially by 
Nietzsche and practiced later by Michel Foucault”.  
 
Foucault’s more pluralist form of critique manifests its profound educational relevance in that 
critique becomes manifested as a general educational and epistemological approach to 
knowledge, and practical politics.  For Foucault knowledge and change are achieved not 
through collection of the data positivistically, or the rational discussion and implementation of 
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policy, but through criticism. Criticism is practical in that it leads to a transformation of 
structures and helps to demystify the ideological fog surrounding contemporary historically 
contingent conceptions of the real. Rather than promoting a utopia of truth, critique as an 
educational tool becomes: 
 
Not a matter of saying things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out what 
kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of 
thought, the practices that we accept rest…Practising criticism is a matter of making 
facile gestures difficult. (Foucault, 1988: 154) 
 
Critique, for Foucault, aims at identifying and exposing the unrecognised forms of power in 
people's lives, to expose and move beyond the forms in which we are entrapped in relation to 
the diverse ways that we act and think. Thus, the primary function of education is in teaching 
the skills, the technē, and the strategies of criticism. In this sense, critique aims to free us from 
the historically transitory constraints of contemporary consciousness as realised in and 
through discursive practices. His commitment is to a form of `permanent criticism' which 
must be seen as linked to his broader programme of freedom of thought. It is the freedom to 
think differently than what we already know. In this sense, Foucault’s conception differs 
profoundly from Kant’s conception of critique. In Foucault’s (1984: 46) own words, criticism 
involves a ‘limit-attitude’: 
 
Criticism indeed consists of analysing and reflecting upon limits. But if the Kantian 
question was that of knowing what limits knowledge must abstain from transgressing it 
seems to me that the critical question today has to be turned back into a positive one: in 
what is given to us as universal, necessary or obligatory, what part is taken up by things 
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which are actually singular, contingent, the product of arbitrary constraints? The point, 
in brief, is to transform critique conducted in the form of necessary limitations into a 
practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression. 
 
This is Foucault’s way of saying that everything can be an object of critique – knowledge, 
practices, and even science. Critique in this sense is not a ‘pure’ method which is free-floating 
in history, but a series of practices that arise from specific historical struggles.  As there can 
be no final transcendence, or absolute enlightenment, however, any progress through criticism 
can be only provisional. It is always a question of beginning again. For Foucault, then, 
education as criticism is thus a permanent interrogation of limits. Today, Foucauldian-inspired 
research in education is interrogating a whole range of phenomena, ranging from concepts 
such as autonomy to neoliberal models of governmentality. 
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